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INTRODUCTION 
The United States and other governments increasingly have 
turned to hiring private military and private security companies 
(jointly “PMSCs”) in situations of armed conflict.1 In light of the 
sudden prominence of PMSCs, as well as notorious instances of 
misconduct,2 there has been recent critical attention devoted to 
the role of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) in regulating 
them. As neither clearly combatants nor civilians, the 
application of IHL to PMSCs remains unclear. The emerging 
consensus among academics and the international community is 
that given the realities of the PMSC industry, the vast majority of 
PMSC personnel will have the status of civilian, which protects 
them unless and until they directly participate in hostilities.3 
Presumptively treating the vast majority of PMSC personnel 
as civilians, although consistent with a general IHL presumption 
in favor of civilian status,4 is overinclusive and leads to legal and 
practical difficulties: it fails to recognize the truly military-like 
operations of some PMSCs (indeed, some are contracted to 
perform direct military operations); the indeterminacy of the 
nature and temporal scope of direct participation may prove 
unworkable in practice; and personnel taking an active part in 
                                                                                                                                     
1. See Mohamad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, The Nature and Characteristics of 
Contemporary Armed Conflict, reprinted in PROTECTING HUMAN DIGNITY IN ARMED 
CONFLICT: SPEECHES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON OCCASION OF THE 
140TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NETHERLANDS RED CROSS 20, 21 (Sanne Boswijk ed., 2008) 
(describing “the privatisation and autonomisation of the use of force” as a prominent 
phenomenon in a new paradigm of conflict); see also P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE 
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 9 (2003) (“A new global 
industry has emerged. It is outsourcing and privatization of a twenty-first-century 
variety, and it changes many of the old rules of international politics and warfare.”). 
2. See, e.g., David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis 
Without Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1 (stating that an inquiry found private 
security company (“PSC”) Blackwater’s shootings in Nisour Square, Iraq, had resulted 
in at least fourteen unjustified civilian deaths). 
3. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & DIRECTORATE OF INT’L LAW 
(SWITZ.), THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT: ON PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR STATES RELATED TO OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DURING ARMED CONFLICT (2009) [hereinafter 
MONTREUX DOCUMENT]. 
4. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”). 
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the hostilities are chargeable with unprivileged belligerency for 
duties they may have been hired to perform. 
This Article contends that it is possible and preferable to 
identify a subclassification within PMSCs by treating differently 
PMSCs hired to engage in activities that constitute direct 
participation in hostilities. If PMSCs are contracted to perform 
specified activities constituting direct participation, defined 
below as “contractor combatant activities,” they should be 
considered combatants. Through a suggested treaty provision, 
States contracting PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant 
activities would be required to contractually mandate PMSC 
compliance with Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention. This approach carves out from civilian status a 
category of PMSC personnel that engage in combatant-type 
activities. 
Part I of this Article provides relevant background on IHL 
and PMSCs. Part II highlights the theoretical and practical 
problems with categorically presuming the majority of PMSC 
personnel to have civilian status. Part III details the mechanics 
and benefits of this new approach. Such an approach to 
regulating PMSCs would be both more functional in practice 
and more harmonious with the doctrine and purposes of 
international humanitarian law. 
I. PMSCS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
FRAMEWORK 
The recent and meteoric rise in the presence of PMSCs in 
the theater of armed conflict occurred after the treaties 
governing the law of war were drafted and largely ratified. This 
Part sets out the strain PMSCs have placed on international 
humanitarian law by outlining the nature of PMSCs, identifying 
how international humanitarian law governs their status, and 
detailing attempts to place PMSCs within the framework of IHL. 
A. The Rise and Role of PMSCs 
Private military and security companies have become an 
increasing presence and played an increasing role in situations 
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of armed conflict.5 A preliminary note on terminology: 
Brookings Institute analyst Peter Singer influentially has divided 
PMSCs into three categories—military support firms, military 
consulting firms, and military provider firms.6 Other 
delineations of PMSCs draw distinctions along lethal versus 
nonlethal capabilities and “active” versus “passive” services.7 As 
international humanitarian law is less concerned with formal 
labels and more directed at functional behavior, this Article 
eschews subclassifying PMSCs in favor of a general definition of 
private contractors engaged in security or military operations, 
broadly construed.8 
While governments have employed private actors in warfare 
for centuries, the growth and corporatization of private military 
actors is a post-Cold War phenomenon that emerged in the 
wake of globalization.9 There has been a dramatic increase in 
the prevalence of PMSCs10 and now as many as 200 PMSCs 
operate worldwide.11 Governments increasingly have used 
                                                                                                                                     
5. For a thorough examination of many facets of private military and private 
security companies (“PMSCs”), see generally SINGER, supra note 1. 
6. See id. at 91. 
7. See Doug Brooks, Protecting People: The PMC Potential-Comments and Suggestions 
for the UK Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services 3 (Int’l Peace Operations 
Ass’n, Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.hoosier84.com/0725brookspmc
regs.pdf. 
8. Such an approach is consistent with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’s (“ICRC”) position. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 9 (“‘PMSCs’ are 
private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of 
how they describe themselves.”); id. at 38 cmt. (“[F]rom the humanitarian point of 
view, the relevant question is not how a company is labeled but what specific services it 
provides in a particular instance.”); see also Alexandre Faite, Involvement of Private 
Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications Under International Humanitarian Law, 4 DEF. 
STUD. 166, 168–69 (2004) (discussing the recent rise of private military companies 
(“PMCs”) in modern war zones). Additionally, the United Nations Working Group on 
the Use of Mercenaries has offered a similar definition: “[PMSC] refers to a corporate 
entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by 
physical persons and/or legal entities.” Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the 
Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, 15th Sess., art. 2(a), at 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/15/25, Annex, Draft of a Possible Convention on Private Military and Security 
Companies (PMSCs) for Consideration and Action by the Human Rights Council (July 
2, 2010) [hereinafter Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention]. 
9. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
10. See id. at 40 (“[T]he private military market has expanded in a way not seen 
since the 1700s.”). 
11. See Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United 
States, International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 181, 184 
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PMSCs in situations of armed conflict.12 For example, in the first 
Gulf War there was an estimated 1 contractor per 50 to 100 
soldiers.13 In 2003, contractors accounted for up to thirty 
percent of military support services in Iraq and PMSCs 
constituted the third-largest contributor to the war effort after 
the United States and Britain.14 A leaked 2009 congressional 
report indicated that contractors constituted forty-eight percent 
of US personnel in Iraq and fifty-seven percent in Afghanistan.15 
At the start of 2011, the US Department of Defense was 
employing over 87,000 contractors in Afghanistan and over 
70,000 in Iraq.16 In Afghanistan, those numbers represent a ratio 
of 84 contractors for every 100 soldiers.17 In Iraq, the ratio is 
even higher: 129 contractors for every 100 soldiers.18 
Private military and security companies perform a wide 
variety of work, from armed guarding and protection of persons 
and objects, to maintenance and operation of weapons systems, 
to prisoner detention, to advice to or training of local forces and 
security personnel.19 Some PMSCs are even contracted to 
                                                                                                                                     
(2010) (“Roughly 200 [PMCs] operate worldwide.”). But see Anthony Bianco & 
Stephanie Anderson Forest, Outsourcing War: An Inside Look at Brown & Root, the 
Kingpin of America’s New Military-Industrial Complex, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 68 
(placing the number of PMCs at ninety in 2002). 
12. See Mercenaries: The Baghdad Boom, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2004, at 55 
(describing the “boom” in business for PMCs and citing as an example Global Risk 
Strategies, which, during the invasion of Afghanistan, expanded from a two-man team 
to a company with over 1000 guards); see also Joshua Lipton, DynCorp Dynamite on New 
High, FORBES.COM (June 7, 2007, 10:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/07/
dyncorp-defense-military-markets-equity-cx_jl_0607markets12.html. 
13. See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Pentagon’s Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2003, 
at 100. 
14. See Bianco & Forest, supra note 11; Mercenaries: The Baghdad Boom, supra note 
12. 
15. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 
(2009). 
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE 





19. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 9; see also Private Military and 
Security Companies: The Costs of Outsourcing War, AMNESTY INT’L USA, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights/private-
military-and-security-companies (last visited Jan. 12, 2012); Q&A: Private Security in Iraq, 
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engage directly in combat.20 Others, although contracted to 
provide defensive services, may find themselves in intense 
firefights.21 According to the security consultancy Hart Group: 
“All good companies employ only ex-soldiers or policemen.”22 
Standard equipment includes pistols, rifles, body armor, and 
armored vehicles.23 The PMSCs in Iraq perform the armed 
services of guarding various fixed sites, providing convoy 
security, acting as security escorts of individuals traveling in 
unsecured areas in Iraq, and supplying personal security for 
high-ranking individuals.24 They also perform the unarmed 
security services of operational coordination (establishing and 
managing command, control, and communications operations 
centers), intelligence analysis (gathering information and 
developing threat analysis), and security training to Iraqi 
security forces.25 In Afghanistan, over 18,000 private security 
contractors hired by the US Department of Defense perform 
“personal security, convoy security, and static security missions,” 
although, as the Department of Defense somewhat obliquely 
indicates, “[n]ot all private security contractor personnel are 
armed.”26 
In short, there has been an explosive rise in the prevalence 
and number of contractor personnel utilized in areas of 
ongoing conflict. These PMSCs perform a diffuse array of duties, 
ranging from maintenance to armed convoy security. Even 
                                                                                                                                     
BBC NEWS (May 27, 2004, 9:52 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
3747421.stm [hereinafter BBC Q&A]. 
20. See Keith Somerville, Dogs of War into Doves of Peace, BBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2002, 
3:56 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2403517.stm (describing perhaps the 
most infamous combat contractor, Executive Outcomes, a now-defunct South African 
company that was involved in Angola and Sierra Leone); see also SINGER, supra note 1, 
at 101–18 (devoting a chapter of analysis to Executive Outcomes). 
21. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in 
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 514 (2005) 
(detailing an incident in which Blackwater USA was attacked by insurgents: in the 
ensuing firefight, it expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and hundreds of 
forty millimeter grenades, and resupplied its employees with its own helicopters). 
22. BBC Q&A, supra note 19. 
23. Id. 
24. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3 
(2008). 
25. Id. 
26. USCENTCOM CONTRACTORS, supra note 16. 
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before examining the contours of international humanitarian 
law, one can begin to imagine the difficulty in coherently 
classifying or regulating such a diverse set of actors. 
B. International Humanitarian Law 
At the heart of international humanitarian law lies the 
fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians.27 
This principle performs two equally important functions in 
situations of armed conflict. First, it aims to protect civilians to 
the maximum extent possible from the effects of armed 
conflict.28 Second, only combatants have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities.29 This Section outlines the provisions of 
IHL that govern a person’s status, under both international 
armed conflict and internal armed conflict.30 
Treaties applicable to situations of international armed 
conflict create the binary distinction of members of armed 
forces and civilians. Under the Third Geneva Convention, 
combatants include official, militia, and volunteer members of 
the armed forces (Article 4(A)(1)); members of other militias 
and volunteer corps that meet specified conditions (Article 
4(A)(2)); members of an armed force of a government not 
recognized by the Detaining Power (Article 4(A)(3)); and 
                                                                                                                                     
27. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 
87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 198 (2005) (listing as the very first rule of customary 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”): “The parties to the conflict must at all times 
distinguish between civilians and combatants”). 
28. See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 171 (“It is a cornerstone of international 
humanitarian law that, while civilians must be protected to the largest possible extent 
from the effects of armed conflict and may not be attacked, enemy combatants 
represent military targets and may be attacked lawfully as long as they are not hors de 
combat.”). 
29. See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate Levels of 
Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 218–31 (2005) (describing 
combatant status under international humanitarian law). 
30. As do many academic commentaries, for the sake of simplicity, this Article 
classifies IHL provisions on armed conflict into “international” and “internal” (or 
“noninternational”). See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 171–72. Nonetheless, it bears 
noting that there are gradations within both international and internal armed conflict. 
See, e.g., RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 247–
69 (2002) (describing five distinct categories of armed conflict: two international 
(Geneva Conventions, Protocol I), two internal (Protocol II, Common Article 3), and 
internal disturbances not cognizable as armed conflict under IHL). 
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participants in a levée en masse, or citizens who respond 
spontaneously to invasion (Article 4(A)(6)).31 Article 4(A)(2), 
based on the Hague Regulations of 1907,32 requires that other 
militias must “belong” to a party to the conflict, and includes 
organized resistance movements.33 To qualify as combatants 
under Article 4(A)(2), however, the militia or volunteer corps 
must comply with four requirements: they must (a) have a 
command structure; (b) have a “fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance;” (c) carry arms openly; and (d) 
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war.34 
Article 4(A)(2) generated significant controversy in drafting, as 
States differed on whether to recognize unconventional fighters 
or resistance groups as combatants.35 They reached a 
compromise by including the four formal requirements.36 The 
levée en masse constitutes the only armed actors without any 
institutional organization to still be considered combatants.37 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions maintains a similar 
approach and clarifies that a civilian is any person who does not 
belong to one of the above specified categories of combatants.38 
Moreover, in case of doubt, a person shall be considered a 
civilian.39 Protocol I also carves out mercenaries from having 
combatant privileges.40 The treaty defines mercenary narrowly, 
however, with six formal elements that must be met: (a) being 
specially recruited in order to fight; (b) taking a direct part in 
the hostilities; (c) being motivated essentially by the desire for 
                                                                                                                                     
31. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
32. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. 
33. Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2). 
34. Id. 
35. See Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 
391, 417–20 (2010). 
36. Id. at 418. 
37. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 839 (2010). 
38. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50(1); see FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 87 (3d ed. 2001) (describing 
the Protocol I distinction between combatants and civilians). 
39. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50(1). 
40. Id. art. 47(1). 
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private gain; (d) being neither a national of a party to the 
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the 
conflict; (e) not being a member of the armed forces of a party 
to the conflict; and (f) not being sent by a State that is not a 
party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces.41 
In internal armed conflict, neither Common Article 3 nor 
Protocol II defines combatant or civilian.42 Nonetheless, both 
assume categorical distinctions by using the terminology of 
“armed forces.”43 According to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (“ICRC”), the “wording and logic” of both reveal 
that “civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups of the 
parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories also in 
noninternational armed conflict.”44 This proposition is not 
entirely settled,45 but none doubt that IHL aims to protect 
civilians in both international and internal armed conflict.46 
                                                                                                                                     
41. Id. art. 47(2); see Faite, supra note 8, at 169 (stating that the rigid definition of 
mercenary has been judged unworkable by many). 
42. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Protocol II]. 
43. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 3(1) (“Persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their 
arms and those placed hors de combat . . . .”); Protocol II, supra note 42, art. 1(1) 
(describing the conflict between “armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups”). 
44. Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 991, 1003 (2008); see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the 
Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1527 (2007) (“Common Article 3 
necessarily presumes the existence of combatants, because by protecting civilians, the 
article explicitly affirms the existence of hostilities, which inevitably draws attention to 
the legal status of those persons engaged in violence.”). 
45. Compare Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-in-Review, 7 NW. 
U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 170, 189 n.89 (2009) (describing a case before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia accepting as analogous rules governing 
status in international and internal armed conflicts), with Richard Murphy & Afsheen 
John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 421 
(2009) (highlighting the position of some that the status of “combatant” has no 
relevance in internal armed conflict). 
46. See, e.g., Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under 
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 150 (2009) (stating that as “an uncontroversial 
principle of customary international law, parties to an armed conflict must distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants,” which extends to situations of 
internal armed conflict). 
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Accordingly, in any armed conflict of sufficient magnitude to 
trigger application of the regime of IHL, the principle of 
civilian/combatant distinction applies. 
A broader terminology based upon the international 
humanitarian law treaties describes various types of combatants 
in both international and internal armed conflict as “organized 
armed groups.” In international armed conflict, they are either 
the irregular armed forces belonging to a State (such as militia 
and volunteer corps), or organized resistance movements.47 In 
internal conflict, they are the armed forces of a non-State 
party.48 As Nils Melzer, legal adviser to the ICRC, explains: 
“Organized armed groups constitute armed forces in a strictly 
functional sense, in that they are de facto charged with the 
conduct of hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict.”49 
Determining membership in an organized armed group is a 
functional, not formal, inquiry that turns on whether the 
group’s continuous function is to directly participate in 
hostilities.50 This terminology is helpful, as it bridges both 
international and internal armed conflict to identify non-State 
combatant actors. 
Regardless of the nature of conflict, another foundation of 
international humanitarian law is that civilians are to be 
protected unless and until they directly participate in 
hostilities.51 The Commentary to Protocol I defined “direct 
participation” as “acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment 
of the enemy armed forces.”52 Nonetheless, the concept of 
“direct participation” has been difficult to delineate.53 This 
difficulty is intuitively unsurprising, as the permutations of 
activities that could be interpreted to support hostilities are 
                                                                                                                                     
47. See Melzer, supra note 37, at 838; see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, 
art. 4(A)(1)–(2). 
48. See Melzer, supra note 37, at 838. 
49. Id. at 839. 
50. See id. 
51. See Henckaerts, supra note 27, at 198 (listing this proposition as one of the 
customary rules of IHL). 
52. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 619 
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
53. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 6 (labeling the issue as “one of the most difficult, 
but as yet unresolved issues of international humanitarian law”). 
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nearly limitless. One can imagine a spectrum ranging from the 
soldier on the ground to the taxpayer whose money funds the 
military. At what point in between does one draw the line for 
activities that constitute “direct participation” and those 
activities that do not? Compounding the difficulty is status 
fluidity: a civilian who directly participates in hostilities loses 
civilian status, but only “for such time as” she participates 
directly.54 Once the civilian ceases to participate directly, she 
regains her civilian status.55 Although simple in theory, the 
temporal requirement can lead to fears of a “revolving door” in 
which a daytime civilian fights during the night, only to return 
to protected civilian status the next day, and so on and so 
forth.56 
Following a large-scale endeavor to better clarify the 
concept, the ICRC released guidance on “direct participation in 
hostilities.”57 Notwithstanding the ninety-odd pages of analysis, 
essentially a civilian directly participates through a specific act 
that meets a certain threshold of harm, has a direct causal link 
to the harm, and is designed to support one party in the conflict 
to the detriment of another.58 The ICRC also focused the 
temporal component: “Civilians lose protection against direct 
attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities.”59 Notwithstanding the extended 
effort to bring clarity to “direct participation,” commentators 
already have launched a heated debate as to the approach, 
viability, and feasibility of the document.60 The central fault line 
concerns whether the ICRC’s publication too heavily favors 
civilian protection at the expense of military efficiency and 
                                                                                                                                     
54. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3); see Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: 
The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 
742 (2010). 
55. See Boothby, supra note 54, at 759. 
56. See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 
686 (2010); see also Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
115, 157 (2010) (examining complications of temporal civilian status). 
57. Melzer, supra note 44, at 991. 
58. Id. at 995–96. 
59. Id. at 996 (emphasis added). 
60. See generally Forum, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 (2010) (containing four articles 
critiquing and one defending the ICRC’s approach). 
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necessity.61 This Article leaves to better hands the task of striking 
the proper balance between military necessity and civilian 
protection, but simply notes that satisfactorily defining “direct 
participation in hostilities” has proven to be an elusive target. 
Overall, the principle of distinction between combatants 
and civilians is virtually the sine qua non of international 
humanitarian law and applies whenever IHL itself applies. 
Civilians are protected unless and until they directly participate 
in hostilities, although the precise contours of “direct 
participation” remain hazy. 
C. Recent Attempts at Classification 
The international community has struggled to determine 
the placement of PMSCs within the framework of IHL. PMSCs 
strain the binary principle of distinction due to the variable 
nature of their duties. One private contractor may seem 
distinctly civilian by providing “ash and trash” duties like 
maintaining planes or hauling garbage, while another may 
appear indisputably a combatant by carrying a gun and serving 
alongside active-duty Special Forces soldiers.62 How then does 
one fit a seemingly fluid group into a presumptive status? There 
have been two recent, large-scale efforts to address this question: 
one by the ICRC, and the other by the United Nations (“UN”) 
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 
peoples to self-determination (“Mercenary Working Group”). 
The ICRC, in conjunction with seventeen governments, 
produced the Montreux Document, which seeks to provide 
interpretive guidance on the legal obligations of States related 
to PMSCs in the absence of a clearly applicable treaty or 
provision.63 According to the document, regardless of their 
status under IHL (combatant or civilian), the personnel of 
PMSCs must comply with international humanitarian law.64 As 
                                                                                                                                     
61. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010). 
62. See Schwartz, supra note 13 (describing different duties of US contractors in 
the Middle East). 
63. See Paul Seger & Philip Spoerri, Foreword to MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra 
note 3, at 5. 
64. Id. at 14. 
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far as their status, they are protected as civilians unless they fit 
one of three exceptions: (1) they are incorporated into the 
regular armed forces of a State; (2) they are members of 
organized armed forces, groups, or units under a command 
responsible to the State; or (3) they otherwise lose their 
protections as determined by international humanitarian law.65 
The commentary accompanying the Montreux principles 
clarifies that the “members of organized armed forces” prong 
refers to the requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third 
Geneva Convention.66 In other words, PMSC personnel are not 
considered civilians if they are under responsible command, 
have a distinctive fixed sign, carry arms openly, and obey the 
laws of war.67 According to the commentary, the third 
exception—otherwise lose their protection—refers to the 
concept of a “rebel soldier” in noninternational armed 
conflict.68 The commentary also elaborates that the status of 
PMSC personnel requires a case-by-case analysis and depends on 
the relevant contract and services, but that the “large majority of 
PMSC personnel” will likely be civilians.69 
To summarize the position of the Montreux Document, 
PMSC personnel are presumed to be civilians. Only if they are 
formally incorporated into armed forces, rigidly adhere to 
Article 4(A)(2), or act as rebel soldiers in a noninternational 
armed conflict, will they be considered combatants. 
The Mercenary Working Group has drawn an even stricter 
line in favor of civilian status. The mandate extension of the 
Mercenary Working Group charged it with preparing a draft of 
international basic principles regulating private military and 
security companies.70 The Mercenary Working Group recently 
fulfilled this mandate by preparing a draft Convention on 
Private Military and Security Companies (“PMSC Draft 
                                                                                                                                     
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 36 cmt.; see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
67. See Montreux Document, supra note 3, at 36 cmt.; see also Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2). 
68. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt. 
69. Id. at 36 cmt. 
70. See Human Rights Council Res. 7/21, Mandate of the Working Group on the 
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise 
of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶ 2(e), 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/7/21 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
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Convention”).71 The UN Human Rights Council considered the 
PMSC Draft Convention and voted thirty-two to twelve to 
establish a working group to consider elaborating a legally 
binding instrument to regulate PMSCs, based on the PMSC 
Draft Convention.72 
In the PMSC Draft Convention, the Mercenary Working 
Group has taken a broad “international law” approach and 
combines both human rights and humanitarian law in its 
proposed regulation of PMSCs.73 The PMSC Draft Convention 
focuses on regulation of PMSCs by State parties, requiring States 
to ensure that PMSCs respect international human rights and 
international humanitarian law.74 Although the PMSC Draft 
Convention does not address the mechanics of how IHL should 
govern PMSC status, it does prohibit the use of force by PMSCs 
to, inter alia, overthrow a government, change borders of a 
State, target civilians, cause disproportionate harm, or provide 
training to accomplish any of the above.75 It also prohibits PMSC 
personnel from engaging in 
inherently State functions, including direct participation in 
hostilities, waging war and/or combat operations, taking 
prisoners, law-making, espionage, intelligence, knowledge 
transfer with military, security and policing application, use 
of and other activities related to weapons of mass 
destruction, police powers, especially the powers of arrest or 
detention including the interrogation of detainees, and 
other functions that a State Party considers to be inherently 
State functions.76 
This restriction is very broad on permissible PMSC 
activities, as it essentially prohibits PMSC personnel from 
                                                                                                                                     
71. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8. 
72. See Human Rights Council Res. 15/26, Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory 
Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private 
Military and Security Companies, ¶ 4, at 2, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/26 
(Oct. 7, 2010). 
73. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8, 
Annex ¶ PP 2, at 21 (recognizing the “principles and rules of international human 
rights and humanitarian law and their complementarity”). 
74. Id. Annex art. 4(2), at 26; id. Annex art. 5(1), at 27; id. Annex arts. 7(1)–(2), 
at 28. 
75. Id. Annex art. 8, at 28–29. 
76. Id. Annex art. 9, at 29. 
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engaging in any combatant activities.77 Moreover, by prohibiting 
direct participation in hostilities, the Draft Convention implicitly 
endorses the notion that PMSC personnel are civilians, not 
combatants. 
Commentators also have weighed in as to the status of 
PMSC personnel under IHL. Applying the framework of 
international humanitarian law, they have uniformly concluded 
that the majority of PMSC personnel will fall under the category 
of civilian.78 Based on the realities of the industry, the vast 
majority of contractors will be considered civilians because they 
are almost never formally incorporated79 and will seldom meet 
all requirements of Article 4(A)(2).80 
There have been suggestions that PMSCs should be 
considered mercenaries under IHL.81 Given the rigid six-part 
definition of mercenaries set forth in Protocol I, however, most 
commentators conclude that in nearly all circumstances, PMSC 
personnel will not constitute mercenaries.82 The clearest 
                                                                                                                                     
77. One commentator notes that at least one member of the Mercenary Working 
Group criticized the Montreux Document for recognizing de facto and legitimizing the 
PMSC industry, which may explain in part the much stricter regulation in the proposed 
PMSC Convention. See Nigel D. White, The Privatisation of Military and Security Functions 
and Human Rights: Comments on the UN Working Group’s Draft Convention, 11 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 133, 135 (2011). 
78. See, e.g., Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their Status Under 
International Humanitarian Law and Its Impact on Their Regulation, 88 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 573, 587 (2006); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private 
Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
525, 539 (2006). 
79. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 78, at 583 (stating that “the whole point of 
privatization is precisely the opposite” of formal incorporation); Schmitt, supra note 21, 
at 525 (concluding that PMSCs will almost never be formally incorporated into armed 
forces and that formal incorporation requires more than a contract); see also Gillard, 
supra note 78, at 533 (“[T]here are likely to be very few instances in which the staff of 
PMCs/PSCs are incorporated into the armed forces . . . .”). 
80. See Daniel P. Ridlon, Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed 
Contractors in Iraq, 62 A.F. L. REV. 199, 248–49 (2008); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527–31; 
see also Cameron, supra note 78, at 583–85; Gillard, supra note 78, at 534–36. 
81. See, e.g., Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global 
Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 17–26 (1999). 
82. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 40 cmt.; see also, e.g., Ebrahim, 
supra note 11, at 210–12; Faite, supra note 8, at 169–70; E. L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? 
The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its Implications for International 
Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 232–33 (2008); Kevin H. 
Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses Its 
Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 55, 83 (2008); Ridlon, supra note 80, at 232. 
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stumbling block is Protocol I Article 47(2)(a)’s requirement of 
being “specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in 
an armed conflict,” because PMSCs rarely are contracted 
specifically to fight.83 Interestingly, although the Mercenary 
Working Group was tasked with drafting a treaty to regulate 
PMSCs, it similarly has concluded that most PMSCs do not fit 
the mercenary definition.84 
In sum, PMSCs now form an integral part of the landscape 
of armed conflict. Given the varied nature of their operations, 
their collocation within the regime of IHL can be described as 
uncomfortable at best. There is a general consensus that under 
the framework of international humanitarian law, the great 
majority of PMSC personnel will have civilian status. The ICRC 
has placed them presumptively on the civilian side of the 
combatant-civilian dichotomy. The Mercenary Working Group 
effectively would confine PMSC personnel to civilian status by 
favoring the outright prohibition of any direct participation in 
hostilities. The next Part examines whether treating PMSC 
personnel as presumptively (or categorically) civilian is the 
optimal approach within the framework of international 
humanitarian law. 
II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL DEFICIENCIES 
Presuming PMSC personnel to be civilians honors a general 
IHL principle of resolving doubt over status in favor of civilian.85 
Nonetheless, as this Part demonstrates, there are substantial 
drawbacks with this global presumption in the context of 
PMSCs. First, if determining direct participation is inherently 
difficult, the problem is only exacerbated in the situation of 
PMSCs, leading to legal and practical inadequacies. Second, 
civilian status for certain PMSCs may have the perverse effect of 
leaving them unable to lawfully engage in response to 
predictable combat, effectively rendering unlawful any 
participation in hostilities. 
                                                                                                                                     
83. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 47(2)(a). 
84. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8, 
¶ 38 (“PMSC personnel cannot usually be considered to be mercenaries . . . .”). 
85. See Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50. 
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A. Difficulties in Determining Direct Participation 
With civilian status, PMSC personnel are protected from 
attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.86 Determining direct participation for any civilian is 
difficult; the ICRC crafted ten recommendations to determine 
direct participation, but the ninety pages of guidance attest to 
the residual ambiguity in applying the recommendations.87 The 
inherent difficulties in determining civilian participation 
become heightened in the context of PMSC personnel, given 
the variable nature of their duties. The Montreux commentary 
provides examples of direct participation by contractors: 
guarding military bases against attacks from the enemy party, 
gathering tactical military intelligence, and operating weapons 
systems in a combat operation.88 In contrast, direct participation 
does not include equipment maintenance, logistic services, 
guarding diplomatic missions or other civilian sites, or 
catering.89 Nor does it include collection of intelligence of a 
nontactical nature or purchasing, smuggling, manufacturing, or 
maintaining weapons and equipment outside specific military 
operations.90  
Yet, despite these neatly drawn categories, the distinctions 
can break down quickly. The ICRC recognizes as much and 
provides as an example the thin line “between the defence of 
military personnel and other military objectives against enemy 
attacks (direct participation in hostilities) and the protection of 
those same persons and objects against crime or violence 
unrelated to the hostilities (law enforcement/defence of self or 
others).”91 This difference can become even fuzzier in the 
context of resisting attack by an outlawed resistance group, since 
such groups teeter between combatant and civilian status; 
                                                                                                                                     
86. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 995; see also Govern & Bales, supra note 81, at 72 
(“The legal fate of individual contractors turns entirely on what is meant by ‘direct 
participation’ in hostilities.”). 
87. Melzer, supra note 44, at 995–96. 
88. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt. 
89. Id. at 39 cmt. 
90. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1008. But see Faite, supra note 8, at 173 (“[I]t is 
arguable that private contractors involved in transportation of weapons and other 
military commodities, intelligence, strategic planning or procurement of arms, may 
lose the protection afforded to civilians . . . .”). 
91. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1010. 
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consequently, engaging with the group could constitute direct 
participation in hostilities or it could constitute a police 
operation apart from hostilities.92 One can also imagine a thin 
line regarding collecting intelligence: What constitutes 
“nontactical” intelligence? What if the intelligence later 
becomes tactically useful?93 Similarly, the distinction between 
military and civilian sites may be blurred where the site is not 
part of military infrastructure but is a legitimate military target.94 
Additionally, while the ICRC limits operating weapons to 
constitute direct participation only when done in a combat 
operation (which seems to imply some form of affirmative 
planning and engagement), another commentator considers it 
natural that PMSC forces directly participate in hostilities when 
they engage in defensive actions seeking to harm enemy 
personnel.95 It also bears noting that fighting to attack and 
fighting to defend are legally insignificant distinctions in the 
IHL regime: both constitute direct participation.96 
Moreover, there is a clear temporal problem with 
determining direct participation of PMSC personnel. For 
example, Alexandre Faite, a legal advisor to the ICRC, highlights 
that on-duty contractors guarding military infrastructures may 
be directly participating, whereas off-duty contractors are not.97 
As civilians are protected from attack when not directly 
participating in hostilities, a contractor’s status could switch 
from combatant to civilian with the end of her five o’clock shift. 
The real problem with these indeterminacies is that they 
exist on a constant continuum: they stretch from the general 
                                                                                                                                     
92. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 589–90. 
93. Cf. Faite, supra note 8, at 173 (contending that any intelligence activity for the 
military constitutes direct participation). 
94. See id. at 175 (highlighting the ambiguity between military and civilian sites); 
see also Anthony Dworkin, Security Contractors in Iraq: Armed Guards or Private Soldiers?, 
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-
security.html (“The most difficult question posed by the role of contract security forces 
in Iraq may well be this: is the official use of security contractors to defend legitimate or 
predictable targets in the face of an organized uprising tantamount to having them 
engage in hostilities?”). 
95. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt.; Ridlon, supra note 80, at 
234. 
96. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 588 (citing Article 49 of Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions); Gillard, supra note 78, at 540. 
97. See Faite, supra note 8, at 174–75. 
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nature of the activity (e.g., what kind of intelligence gathering? 
Guarding what kind of building?) to the specific circumstances 
of any given instance (e.g., on-duty or off? Specific combat 
operation or not?). If the above examples were hypothetical 
variants on the fringe of PMSC behavior, then the gray area 
would only be implicated in a small subset of situations. These 
ambiguities, however, exist in a great variety of situations.98 
Indeed, for this reason, the ICRC states that the question of 
direct participation must be considered on a case-by-case basis, 
although it does not clarify who should be making the case-by-
case determination.99 
The Mercenary Working Group’s PMSC Draft Convention 
favors a bright line in place of a presumption, prohibiting PMSC 
personnel from engaging in direct participation.100 On its face, 
this approach appears simple. Unfortunately, it too suffers from 
serious defects. First, as a practical matter, the presence of 
contractors in the theater of armed conflict is a reality.101 As 
discussed, PMSC personnel engage in a wide variety of activities 
that constitute direct participation. Prohibiting them outright 
from engaging in direct participation would require an 
enormous change in the way PMSCs are utilized; they would not 
be permitted to guard military personnel or infrastructure, 
gather intelligence of any tactical nature, or engage in defensive 
actions against an enemy.102 Although this may be a laudable 
                                                                                                                                     
98. See, e.g., Ebrahim, supra note 11, at 187–88 (“Often, PMCs provide security for 
military, political, and corporate individuals and installations in states like Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Security and policing often entails counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, 
and other special operations, in which firms possess large scale military capabilities. 
Although they are formally positioned as security forces targeting criminal elements, 
they occasionally engage in activities that resemble traditional combat, due to the 
nature and scope of international security threats.” (footnotes omitted)). 
99. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 1013 (stating that due consideration must be 
given to the circumstances of each case); see also MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, 
¶ 24, at 14, 36 cmt. (suggesting a determination of PMSC personnel status on a case-by-
case basis). 
100. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8, 
Annex art. 9, at 29. 
101. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 78, at 526 (“[T]he past years have witnessed a 
significant growth in the involvement of PMCs/PSCs in security and military functions 
in situations of armed conflict.”). 
102. Cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 234 (discussing activities of private contractor 
personnel in Iraq and describing the likelihood that they will engage in confrontation 
with enemy forces). 
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goal of the PMSC Draft Convention, the prospects of enacting 
such a shift in the utilization of PMSCs are daunting and likely 
unrealistic. 
Second, civilian status under IHL is fluid because civilians 
in areas of armed conflict sometimes do directly participate in 
hostilities. Categorically prohibiting PMSC personnel from 
direct participation could render unlawful any participation, 
even if the hostilities were brought to the PMSC personnel, 
rather than the other way around. Such defensive encounters 
are commonplace.103 Third, the prohibition hits the same 
theoretical wall: what is direct participation? PMSCs can avoid 
engaging in direct participation only if they know what it is. 
Ultimately, both approaches rely on determining what 
constitutes direct participation. Yet, if a multiyear and large-scale 
effort by the ICRC and leading scholars to define direct 
participation has failed to resolve ambiguity (even if 
intentionally so), how can parties involved in armed conflict 
know when PMSC personnel are directly participating in 
hostilities? 
International humanitarian law seeks to regulate the 
behavior of parties engaged in armed conflict.104 This 
uncertainty surrounding the exact meaning of “direct 
participation” presents at least two clear problems. First, status 
affects legal entitlements: civilians directly participating in 
hostilities do not receive the benefits of combatant status.105 
High levels of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding direct 
participation therefore make it difficult for PMSCs to comply 
with IHL.106 Second, assuming that other parties engaged in an 
armed conflict seek to comply with the law of war, how do they 
determine whether PMSC personnel are “directly participating” 
in hostilities? In other words, how can they know whether they 
                                                                                                                                     
103. See id. (“The activities which the armed PMFs in Iraq carry out, though 
defensive in nature, lead to engagements with elements of the insurgency.”). 
104. See KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 38, at 12 (describing the broad 
purpose of IHL as aiming “to restrain the parties to an armed conflict . . . and to 
provide essential protection to those most directly affected”). 
105. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 21, at 519–22 (detailing some potential 
consequences for civilians directly participating in hostilities). 
106. See Dworkin, supra note 94 (“[I]t remains troubling that the United States is 
putting people into conflict situations whose training, rules of engagement and legal 
accountability are unclear.”). 
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can lawfully target such contractors? Even if the opposing 
combatants seek to abide by the law of war, there may be no 
principled way for them to determine PMSC personnel’s status 
and, in some instances, they could attack PMSC personnel 
lawfully, claiming direct participation in hostilities. At bottom, 
relying on direct participation to determine the status of PMSC 
personnel becomes a rigid exercise of formalism: in a great 
variety of situations, it is only through a difficult (and subjective) 
post hoc legal determination that parties to a conflict learn the 
status of PMSC personnel. Such a result provides no workable 
standard for any party involved in armed conflict. 
B. Illegal Combatants? 
Beyond the indeterminacy of “direct participation,” there is 
a major theoretical drawback to broadly classifying PMSC 
personnel as civilians: civilians have no right to engage in 
hostilities, so any participation would constitute unprivileged 
belligerency (or, in the Bush parlance, “unlawful enemy 
combatancy”).107 There are two sides to the same coin of 
unprivileged belligerency: one involves participation in 
hostilities, and the other concerns the consequences of being 
captured and chargeable as an unprivileged belligerent. 
The true benefit of civilian status is protection from 
attack;108 however, PMSCs frequently operate in areas where 
attacks by non-State actors unconcerned with the regime of IHL 
are predictable.109 According to the ICRC: “[T]heir proximity to 
                                                                                                                                     
107. See id. (stating that direct participation in hostilities by contractors would be 
legally analogous to Al Qaeda actions on an Afghanistan battlefield); Ridlon, supra note 
80, at 233 (“If PMF personnel took part in hostilities, they would not only lose their 
protection and become viable targets, but they also would become illegal 
combatants.”); cf. Faite, supra note 8, at 174 (“[I]t is striking that detainees in 
Guantanamo were denied both prisoner of war status and the protection of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention on the basis of what could be a daily bread-and-butter for private 
contractors in Iraq: direct participation in the hostilities of individuals that are not 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.”). 
108. See, e.g., Karma Nabulsi, Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents: One 
Hundred Years After the Hague Peace Conferences, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 9, 18 (Simon 
Chesterman ed., 2001) (describing the post-World War II normative shift towards 
protecting civilians). 
109. See Dworkin, supra note 94 (“Iraqi militias have routinely targeted supply 
convoys, and have also targeted other sites guarded by private security contractors, 
notably regional offices of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Although these are 
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the armed forces and other military objectives may expose them 
more than other civilians to the dangers arising from military 
operations, including the risk of incidental death or injury.”110 
In light of their proximity to sites of attack, it seems that PMSC 
personnel face a Catch-22: they are obligated contractually to 
defend against potential attack, but upon returning fire are 
directly participating in hostilities unlawfully. This concern is 
somewhat mitigated by the doctrine of self-defense, but its scope 
and application are highly dependent on circumstance and do 
not reach to all situations.111 
Beyond the theoretical prohibition of participating in 
hostilities lies a very tangible consequence: if captured, unlawful 
combatants do not receive prisoner-of-war status.112 Indeed, they 
may even be tried for the simple act of participation, regardless 
of whether it violated international humanitarian law.113 One 
could contend that by agreeing to operate in conflict areas for 
substantial amounts of money,114 PMSC personnel have 
consented to this risk. Consenting to potentially face hostile fire, 
however, should not be conflated with consenting to commit 
acts of unprivileged belligerency. It is highly doubtful that 
individuals joining PMSCs intend to consent to facing 
prosecution under the laws of war simply for guarding a military 
objective or returning hostile fire. 
Less formally, there is also a striking subcurrent of double 
standards. The United States has taken the position in its 
military commissions system at Guantánamo Bay that any act 
taken by an “unlawful combatant” can violate the law of war.115 A 
                                                                                                                                     
civilian not military buildings, they have nevertheless been regularly attacked by Iraqi 
insurgents as part of a military campaign. They are predictable if not lawful targets.”). 
110. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1010. 
111. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 237–48. 
112. See id. at 219. 
113. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 531, 541. But see Schmitt, supra note 21, at 520–
21 (contending that “the better position is that only the acts underlying direct 
participation are punishable”). 
114. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of 
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355, 375–76 (2010) 
(describing reports of contractors earning several multiples of a military member’s 
salary). 
115. See Joseph C. Hansen, Note, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibiting 
the Executive’s Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1882–83 
(2009) (detailing how the Manual for Military Commissions criminalizes any action 
taken by an “unlawful combatant” as a violation of the law of war). 
720 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:698 
civilian contractor directly participating in hostilities, however, 
would also be an unlawful combatant.116 Yet—to indulge a little 
hyperbole—civilian contractors employed by the United States 
who have directly participated in hostilities do not number 
among the ranks of the detainees at Guantánamo. As one 
commentator diplomatically observed, “voluntarily creating a 
pool of ‘good’ but potentially ‘unlawful combatants’ while 
simultaneously condemning other (non-private sector) civilian 
participants in hostilities verges on hypocrisy.”117 International 
humanitarian law provides a framework designed to regulate the 
conduct of all involved in armed conflict; it is therefore an 
untenable position to condemn (and even criminalize) the 
direct participation of certain civilian actors while condoning 
(and even contracting) the participation of others. 
There is, therefore, a glaring problem. PMSCs now figure 
prominently in the landscape of armed conflict. The broad 
consensus is that the majority of their personnel have civilian 
status. This assessment of their formal status is undoubtedly 
correct under international humanitarian law. Yet this status is 
plagued by practical problems: many PMSC personnel directly 
participate in hostilities (some continuously, others frequently, 
and some occasionally), which is unlawful behavior for civilians. 
Rather than enjoy the benefits of civilian status, PMSC 
personnel who directly participate will suffer the perverse result 
of engaging in unlawful behavior. Even if they seek to comply 
with the strictures of IHL, they may not be able to, as 
determining direct participation is decidedly difficult.118 The 
same goes for other parties who may be unable to distinguish 
PMSC personnel from soldiers.119 
The result is baffling: correctly categorizing the great 
majority of PMSC personnel under international humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                     
116. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 233. 
117. Cameron, supra note 78, at 594. 
118. Cf. id. at 589 (“[T]he determination [of] whether a person actually does 
directly participate in hostilities does not necessarily depend on whether that person 
intended to do so.”). 
119. Michael Schmitt recounts a sobering anecdote of a courtyard full of military 
and PMSC personnel in Iraq, none of whom can identify to which companies or armies 
the others belong because “they all look so alike, there’s no way to tell.” Schmitt, supra 
note 21, at 530–31 n.77. 
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law as civilian provides all sides involved in an armed conflict 
with no workable standards by which to regulate their behavior. 
III. CATEGORICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS 
Analytically and practically, it therefore makes sense to 
consider some PMSC personnel to be combatants rather than 
civilians: the chances they directly participate in hostilities are 
high and the chances their civilian status will protect them are 
low. Reversing the presumption from treating their status as 
generally civilian to generally combatant, however, suffers from 
basic defects under international humanitarian law. First, 
considering PMSCs to be presumptively combatants essentially 
disregards the framework of IHL because most PMSC personnel 
do not fit the technical requirements for combatant status set 
forth in humanitarian treaties.120 Second, it flips the problem of 
considering them to be presumptively civilians, as either 
approach (presumptively combatant or presumptively civilian) is 
overinclusive: many contractors do not engage in combatant 
activities, but are instead simply support personnel. Accordingly, 
the solution to the underlying problems of treating the majority 
of PMSC personnel as having civilian status cannot be to simply 
reclassify them as presumptively combatants. 
Recognizing the balance that must be struck between the 
competing tensions of the binary principle of distinction in IHL 
and the multifaceted duties of PMSC personnel, this Part 
suggests a principled line that can be drawn within PMSCs to 
better regulate their placement under international 
humanitarian law. Rather than melding international 
humanitarian law to fit private military and security companies, 
this Part proposes molding PMSCs to fit IHL. PMSC personnel 
contracted to engage specifically in the type of activity that 
constitutes direct participation in hostilities should be 
categorically presumed to be members of organized armed 
forces and should be required to abide by the requirements of 
Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. To provide a 
workable line of distinction, Part III proposes the terminology of 
“contractor combatant activities,” a new subclassification within 
PMSCs. States that hire PMSCs to perform “contractor 
                                                                                                                                     
120. See supra Part I.C. 
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combatant activities” should be required by treaty to mandate 
contractually that the PMSCs meet the combatant requirements 
of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. This Part 
first delineates how this approach would work, and then 
examines the benefits that would result to all sides in an armed 
conflict. 
A. “Contractor Combatant Activities” 
Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, applicable 
in international armed conflict, requires that members of other 
militias must “belong” to a party involved in the conflict and 
must fulfill the following conditions in order to receive 
combatant status: be under responsible command, have a 
distinctive fixed sign, carry arms openly, and obey the laws of 
war.121 In comparison, in noninternational armed conflict, the 
ICRC clarified that determining membership in an organized 
armed group is a purely functional inquiry: “[T]he decisive 
criterion . . . is whether a person assumes a continuous 
function for the group involving his or her direct participation 
in hostilities.”122 PMSC personnel assuming support functions 
would not qualify, but those whose duties constitute continuous 
participation would.123 
The inquiry in international armed conflict is strictly 
formal, and in noninternational armed conflict it is functional. 
Even in noninternational armed conflict, however, the 
functional inquiry turns upon a determination of “direct 
participation,” which, as examined above, can be extremely 
ambiguous in the context of PMSCs. These approaches suffer 
from different weaknesses. The formal inquiry, as an analytical 
matter, undermines the general functional approach of IHL by 
prioritizing strict requirements over the reality of PMSC 
duties.124 The functional noninternational armed conflict 
inquiry seems unworkable as a practical matter.125 
                                                                                                                                     
121. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2). 
122. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1007. 
123. Id. at 1007–08 ; see Melzer, supra note 37, at 890–91 (explaining that a private 
contractor hired to defend a military objective assumes a continuous combat function). 
124. The formal versus functional interpretation of IHL is a value judgment that 
varies depending on the commentator. To remain relevant, IHL must be interpreted 
functionally. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of 
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Instead of either approach, governments employing PMSCs 
should combine the better aspects of each. If PMSC personnel 
are hired to engage in a specific list of actions that constitute 
direct participation in hostilities (detailed below as “contractor 
combatant activities”), they should be presumed to be organized 
armed forces and should be required to comply with the 
requirements of Article 4(A)(2). The legal placement of these 
actions into the combatant box and out of the civilian box 
resolves the indeterminacies of construing direct participation: 
if PMSCs are contracted to engage in any of these actions, they 
will be considered combatants in the conflict. This Section first 
defines “contractor combatant activities” and then details how 
the shift in regulation would be implemented. 
1. Defining “Contractor Combatant Activities” 
If PMSC personnel are hired to engage in prespecified 
activities (“contractor combatant activities”) before entering a 
conflict zone (one where the government has authorized the use 
of force), they should be regulated as organized armed forces. 
The first piece of making this approach workable is to define the 
“contractor combatant activities.” 
It is useful to begin by examining recent governmental 
attempts to constrict the role of PMSCs in armed conflict. 
Consider a proposed US Senate bill, the Stop Outsourcing 
Security Act, which has withered on the vine twice in the 
Subcommittee on Armed Services.126 The bill would require the 
“transition away from the use of private contractors for mission 
critical or emergency essential functions . . . in all conflict 
zones in which Congress has authorized the use of force.”127 The 
bill defines those functions as “activities for which continued 
performance is considered essential to support combat systems 
and operational activities” or whose interruption “would 
                                                                                                                                     
War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1759–65 (2009) (describing the spectrum of interpretations 
of IHL in light of terrorism and the US war on terror). 
125. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the difficulties of determining which actions are 
considered direct participation, and demonstrating how such a determination 
frequently can be reached only after a post hoc legal analysis). 
126. See Stop Outsourcing Security Act of 2010, S. 3023, 111th Cong.; Stop 
Outsourcing Security Act of 2007, S. 2398, 110th Cong.  
127.  S. 3023 § 5(a)(1). 
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significantly affect . . . a military operation.”128 Such activities 
include protective services, security advice and planning, 
military and police training, repair and maintenance for 
weapons systems, prison administration, interrogation, and 
intelligence.129 The definition in the Outsourcing Security bill is 
too broad for purposes of IHL, as it goes well beyond direct 
participation in hostilities.130 Nonetheless, it provides an 
example of separating the work performed by PMSCs into 
different categories. 
Another source of guidance is the US Department of 
Defense’s attempts to determine the work that private 
contractors should not perform. The United States uses the 
concept of an “inherently governmental function” to indicate 
what services the government should not outsource.131 Along 
these lines, the Department of Defense recently listed the 
following activities as ones that contractors should not perform: 
exercising command authority; conducting combat authorized 
by the government; pursuing certain types of security 
operations; handling, determining, and caring for POWs, 
internees, terrorists, and criminals; directing and controlling 
intelligence interrogations; and administering certain detention 
facilities.132 The impermissible security operations, which are 
highly detailed, include, inter alia, providing security in direct 
support of combat, operating in environments with a high 
likelihood of hostile fire, and moving resources through a 
hostile area as part of an offensive operation.133 Additionally, 
contractors should not “perform[] duties critical to combat 
operations,” such as supply and maintenance of strategic 
                                                                                                                                     
128. Id. § 3(1)(A). 
129. Id. § 3(1)(B). 
130. Compare S. 3023 § 3(1)(A) (defining PMSC direct participation to include 
essential “support [for] combat systems and operational activities”), with MONTREUX 
DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 39 cmt. (noting that PMSCs are considered civilians where 
they provide “support functions”). 
131. See Notice of Proposed Policy Letter on Work Reserved for Performance by 
Federal Government Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 16188-02 (Mar. 31, 2010) (providing 
notice of a policy letter by the US Office of Management and Budget with regard to 
work that must be reserved for performance by federal government employees and 
seeking input on its proposed definition of “inherently governmental function”). 
132. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NO. 1100.22: POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
FOR DETERMINING WORKFORCE MIX 17–23 (2010). 
133. Id. at 19–20. 
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weapon systems and other high level technological functions.134 
The US Congress has also stated its “sense” that interrogation of 
any type of detainee is an inherently governmental function.135 
Drawing from the ICRC’s examples, activities performed by 
PMSCs that constitute direct participation in hostilities include 
security of military infrastructure, gathering any intelligence for 
the military, and the use of weapons in combat operations.136 
Commentators also have highlighted activities that constitute 
direct participation, including protection of personnel and 
military assets, staffing of checkpoints, interrogating suspects or 
prisoners, gathering tactical intelligence, participating in 
operations to rescue military personnel, engaging in tactical 
planning of operations, operating weapons systems, and, of 
course, participating in combat operations.137 
Building from these sources, it is possible to provide a 
prespecified list of activities that would constitute contractor 
combatant activities: 
 
Participation in combat operations; 
Security in direct support of combat operations; 
Security of military infrastructure or checkpoints; 
Security of military personnel; 
Supply and maintenance of strategic weapon systems; 
Interrogation of detainees or prisoners; 
Military intelligence gathering; and 
Tactical planning of operations. 
 
This list may not be comprehensive and could be modified 
to cover additional duties that would constitute direct 
participation in hostilities. Again, this list of activities relates to 
the actions for which PMSCs are contracted. PMSCs hired to 
perform civilian tasks (those which do not fall under the rubric 
of contractor combatant activities) may still find themselves 
                                                                                                                                     
134. Id. at 26. 
135. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1057(1), 122 Stat. 4356, 4611 (2008). 
136. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 1017 n.96, 1032; MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra 
note 3, at 37 cmt.; see also supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
137. See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 173–74; Gillard, supra note 78, at 526; Schmitt, 
supra note 21, at 536–45. 
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directly participating in hostilities, but should not be considered 
to have been hired to perform contractor combatant activities. 
It bears noting that some of the above activities, such as 
participation in combat operations, should be considered 
inherently governmental functions, and it may be the case that a 
government cannot legitimately delegate such responsibility to a 
private actor.138 For example, as Professor Nigel White observes, 
the Mercenary Working Group approaches regulating PMSCs 
with the view that “inherently governmental or state functions 
. . . should not be delegated or outsourced. This is . . . a view 
that might not be shared by all governments, especially those 
with the most aggressive approaches to privatisation.”139 The 
reality, however, is that PMSCs are engaging in these activities.140 
Additionally, as examined in the following Section, because this 
proposal suggests treating PMSCs hired to perform contractor 
combatant activities as Article 4(A)(2) parties to the conflict, 
they would “belong” to the contracting State. Accordingly, if a 
government contracts a PMSC to engage in an inherently 
governmental function, under the strictures of IHL the PMSC 
would form part of the government’s forces.141 There remain 
serious legal and normative questions over whether 
governments legitimately can hire PMSCs to engage in 
inherently governmental functions, but in light of the fact that 
they currently do, this proposal at least would provide an 
accountability “hook” between a PMSC and a contracting State. 
It may also, to some extent, mitigate concerns regarding the 
overprivatization of the use of force by directly linking private 
companies to contracting States. It merits emphasizing, 
therefore, that the above list of contractor combatant activities 
                                                                                                                                     
138. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 12 (detailing that violations 
of IHL committed by PMSCs may be attributable to States if the PMSC was contracted 
to “carry out functions normally conducted by organs of the State”); Alon Harel & 
Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-To-Be-Met Challenges for Law and 
Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 772 (2011) (explaining broadly the concept of 
“inherently governmental functions” as those that cannot be permissibly delegated to 
private actors). 
139. See White, supra note 77, at 137. 
140. See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text (describing the type of activities 
that PMSCs engage in today). 
141. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that contracting 
States are liable for violations of IHL committed by members of organized armed 
forces). 
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details activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities, 
not those that permissibly should be performed by PMSCs. 
2. Implementation 
Once defined, the next task is to delineate the mechanics. 
The first piece is to determine who should regulate and how 
regulation should be encouraged or enforced. 
This proposal—like those of the ICRC and the Mercenary 
Working Group—recommends government-level regulation.142 
One commentator notes that focusing exclusively on 
government-level, or “formal,” regulation may not bring realistic 
regulatory results, and suggests encouraging regulation by 
industry associations.143 This point is well-taken, as the 
commentator explains that States often are not willing or able to 
effectively regulate PMSCs.144 The concern, however, is not with 
the theory of governments regulating PMSCs, but with the 
reality of their unwillingness or inability to effectively do so.145 
Among the potential regulators (industry, States, and 
international organizations), States, as entities that actually 
authorize, regulate, and contract PMSCs, remain best-positioned 
to regulate them.146 While recognizing that additional levels of 
regulation by other actors may enhance the results of formal 
regulation, this Article endorses formal State-level regulation as 
the single best approach towards providing effective regulation. 
To address the concern of State unwillingness or inability to 
regulate PMSCs, there must be an incentive or mechanism to 
encourage or require State regulation. The two basic 
                                                                                                                                     
142. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8, 
Annex art. 12, at 30 (“Each State Party shall develop and adopt national legislation to 
adequately and effectively regulate the activities of PMSCs.”); White, supra note 77, at 
135 (“The international law obligations identified, and good practices proposed in the 
Montreux Document are mainly applicable to states . . . .”). See generally MONTREUX 
DOCUMENT, supra note 3. 
143. Surabhi Ranganathan, Between Complicity and Irrelevance? Industry Associations 
and the Challenge of Regulating Private Security Contractors, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 303, 305–06 
(2010). 
144. Id. at 305. 
145. Indeed, although calling for additional regulation by industry associations, 
Surabhi Ranganathan recognizes that States are best-situated to regulate PMSCs. See id. 
at 305–06, 309. 
146. See White, supra note 77, at 143 (“[E]ffective control and accountability of 
PMSCs is dependent on a system of national regulation and enforcement.”). 
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possibilities are to either incentivize States to unilaterally 
regulate PMSCs or to require them to do so through a binding 
treaty. Given the extant problems involving State use of PMSCs 
alongside PMSC prevalence in theaters of conflict, it seems 
overly optimistic to simply incentivize unilateral State regulation 
by highlighting the benefits of more coherent regulation. An 
additional problem with unilateral State recognition is that 
international humanitarian law aims to regulate the conduct of 
all parties to a conflict. If one State unilaterally considers certain 
contractors as having combatant status, there is no guarantee 
that other States would recognize that status. The better method 
is to require government regulation of PMSCs through 
international treaty, notwithstanding the difficulties in drafting, 
adopting, and ratifying any law of war treaty. Treaties have the 
power to bind ratifying States and are of particular importance 
in governing the law of war, given the need for equal application 
of law among parties to a conflict.147 The current draft treaty 
proposed by the Mercenary Working Group would categorically 
prohibit contractors from engaging in direct participation.148 
This Article’s proposal takes a fundamentally different approach 
by recognizing and attempting to regulate the direct 
participation of PMSCs in hostilities, rather than seeking to 
prohibit it. The PMSC Draft Convention, therefore, is an 
unlikely candidate to incorporate this proposal. Nonetheless, 
this Article contends that it is more sensible to coherently 
regulate the direct participation in hostilities of PMSCs than to 
establish a blanket prohibition on direct participation. Whether 
through a modification to the Mercenary Working Group’s draft 
treaty or a different treaty proposal, it is by way of “hard law” in 
the form of an international treaty that governments should be 
required to regulate PMSCs. 
The treaty provision must distinguish which governments 
are to regulate PMSCs. The PMSC Draft Convention 
distinguishes among home States (States where the PMSCs are 
                                                                                                                                     
147. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163, 
165 (2011) (“The current system of the laws of war . . . builds on the principle of the 
equal application of the law—the uniform and generic treatment of all belligerents on 
the battlefield according to the same rules and principles.”). 
148. Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8, 
Annex art. 2(i), at 25. 
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registered or incorporated), contracting States (States that 
directly contract with PMSCs for their services), States of 
operations (in which PMSCs operate), and third States (all other 
States).149 The Montreux Document distinguishes similarly 
among contracting States, territorial States (States on whose 
territory PMSCs operate), home States, and all other States.150 
This suggested treaty provision would focus specifically on 
contracting States. It is contracting States that actually hire 
PMSCs and therefore have the most immediate control and 
responsibility over their presence and actions.151 Perhaps for this 
reason, the Montreux Document provides the most detailed 
regulations for contracting States.152 Additionally, host States are 
likely to be experiencing situations of conflict or postconflict 
weakness, and home States likely have less incentives to regulate 
their own companies. Contracting States, in comparison, decide 
to hire PMSCs and pay them for their services. Without 
contracting States, PMSCs would not be present in situations of 
armed conflict. Contracting States also have a contractual 
relationship with PMSCs, which, as discussed below, provides a 
clearer nexus for purposes of international humanitarian law 
between the private company and the State. Imposing treaty-
level obligations on contracting States is therefore the most 
direct, and potentially most effective, method to regulate 
PMSCs. 
The treaty provision would address both international and 
noninternational armed conflict. In international armed 
conflict, the provision would require governments that employ 
PMSCs to engage in “contractor combatant activities” to insert a 
contractual provision requiring compliance with Article 
4(A)(2). In noninternational armed conflict, the treaty 
provision would recognize that hiring PMSCs to perform 
contractor combatant activities would be tantamount to 
ascribing them a continuous combat function as organized 
                                                                                                                                     
149. Id. Annex art. 2(j)–(m), at 25. 
150. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11–14. 
151. Cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 252 (noting that the United States could be held 
liable for the unlawful participation by contractors in hostilities); White, supra note 77, 
at 147 (“Given that it is the contracting state that is responsible for the presence of 
PMSCs on the territory of another state, it would be incongruous for it not to have due 
diligence obligations when both the home and host state do.”). 
152. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
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armed forces. Under IHL, States employing PMSCs to perform 
contractor combatant activities in situations of noninternational 
armed conflict would not need to require compliance with 
Article 4(A)(2) because Article 4 applies only in situations of 
international armed conflict. Nonetheless, it would be 
normatively better if the treaty provision affirmatively required 
governments employing PMSCs to perform contractor 
combatant activities in noninternational conflict to comply with 
Article 4(A)(2). As examined in the next Section, the 
compliance of PMSCs performing contractor combatant 
activities within the meaning of Article 4(A)(2) results in 
numerous benefits. These benefits would be realized in any 
situation of armed conflict, whether international or 
noninternational. Accordingly, although the treaty should at 
least require compliance with Article 4(A)(2) in situations of 
international armed conflict, additionally requiring compliance 
in internal armed conflict would bring benefits during any 
conflict sufficient to fall within the province of IHL. 
This proposal would be functional, both as a practical 
matter and under international humanitarian law. The practical 
burdens of mandating compliance with the requirements of 
Article 4(A)(2) are not inordinate. Most PMSC personnel 
already meet two of the four requirements: they are under 
responsible command and they carry arms openly.153 The two 
requirements that the majority of personnel arguably do not 
meet are those of wearing a distinctive fixed sign and obeying 
the laws of war.154 Although many PMSC personnel do not 
currently wear a distinctive fixed sign,155 requiring them to do so 
                                                                                                                                     
153. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2)(a), (c); Gillard, supra 
note 78, at 535; Ridlon, supra note 80, at 248–49; Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527–31. 
154. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (determining that PMSC personnel wear a 
variety of attire making them difficult to identify, and that although there have not 
been reports of systemic violations of the laws of war, there have been instances in 
which companies have been accused of serious violations); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 
527–31 (reaching a similar conclusion to Gillard); cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 227, 
248–49 (observing that although PMSC fail to distinguish themselves as required by the 
Convention, it is difficult to discern whether personnel would comply with the law of 
war: “Most of the requirements [of the laws and customs of war] . . . would likely be 
met by the PMFs so long as their rules of engagement were not flagrantly illegal and so 
long as their personnel act with restraint”). 
155. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (“[PMSC personnel] wear a variety of 
attire, ranging from military uniform-like camouflage gear . . . to civilian attire . . . .”). 
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would be simple: if a PMSC took a contract to engage in 
contractor combatant activities, the PMSC would need to 
provide its personnel with a distinctive uniform. Obeying the 
laws of war could be more difficult. Practically, in light of the 
current realities of the industry and its employees, there is good 
reason to doubt the ability of some PMSC personnel to abide by 
the laws of war.156 Nonetheless, as a matter of international 
humanitarian law, requiring PMSCs to comply with Article 
4(A)(2) would need to be done by contracting governments.157 
Contractually mandating law-of-war compliance would increase 
the chances that PMSCs abide by the laws of war, which would 
be a definite improvement over the state of the industry today.158 
Contracting States also could require evidence of past 
compliance or current training programs before awarding a bid 
to a PMSC. 
Contractually mandating compliance with Article 4(A)(2) 
would also fulfill the Article’s prefatory requirement that the 
“other militia” “belong” to a Party to the conflict.159 There 
would be a contractual relationship for the PMSC to perform 
combatant activities on behalf of a Party to the conflict (the 
government). The contract would also require the PMSC to 
abide by the laws of war. This direct contractual relationship 
should be sufficient to meet the “belong” requirement.160 
                                                                                                                                     
156. See generally Dickinson, supra note 114 (providing a fascinating yet unnerving 
examination of the organizational structure and institutional culture of PMSCs). 
157. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11 (indicating that contracting 
States have an obligation to “ensure that PMSCs that they contract and their personnel 
are aware of their [IHL] obligations and trained accordingly”). 
158. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 114, at 380 (“[T]he employees of these 
companies seem to lack a strong sense of even what the applicable laws and norms are, 
let alone have any great commitment to them.”). 
159. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2). 
160. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 534 (asserting that “a contract to perform 
certain services on behalf of a state party to a conflict” easily meets this requirement); 
cf. id. (detailing the “belong” requirement as requiring a “de facto relationship” 
(quoting INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III, GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 57 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de 
Henry trans., 1960)); see also id. (noting that the provision requires, in the words of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a “relationship of dependence and 
allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that party to the conflict” (quoting Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 93–94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999))). 
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In sum, treaty provisions should require governments 
employing PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant activities 
to contractually obligate those companies to fulfill the 
requirements of Article 4(A)(2) (definitely for situations of 
international armed conflict and ideally also in non-
international armed conflict). Defining contractor combatant 
activities and requiring compliance are both feasible. The next 
section examines the benefits of recasting the status of some 
PMSC personnel as combatant, rather than as presumptively 
civilian. 
B. Benefits 
There are both practical and theoretical benefits to this 
approach. The practical benefits are numerous. For one, PMSCs 
would be able to comply more easily with the law of armed 
conflict: they would know at the commencement of a contract 
what kind of duties would constitute combat functions and 
could bid for or avoid such contracts accordingly. Moreover, this 
approach assuages the issues identified above with relying on 
direct participation by providing clarity on the front end. 
Because PMSC personnel hired to perform contractor 
combatant activities would be wearing distinctive fixed signs, all 
sides in the conflict would be able to recognize them as 
combatants. It would also be easier for parties in the conflict to 
differentiate among contractors hired to be combatants and 
contractors hired to be civilians. Additionally, PMSCs receiving 
contracts for such assignments would be required to abide by 
the law of war. Blackwater, for instance, used illegal exploding 
bullets161—as a militia under Article 4(A)(2), it would have been 
clearly forbidden from using such ammunition. There would 
also be a stronger mechanism to ensure accountability, as the 
companies would have a contractual obligation to abide by the 
law of war. Even if obstacles remain to prosecuting individuals 
directly under the law of war, States would have a breach of 
                                                                                                                                     
161. See Stop Outsourcing Security Act of 2010, S. 3203, 111th Cong. § 2(18) 
(detailing congressional findings). 
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contract claim against PMSCs that failed to comply with the laws 
of war.162 
This proposal also fits theoretically within existing 
international humanitarian law. First, by complying with Article 
4(A)(2), PMSC personnel would receive the benefits of 
combatant status.163 By the same token, they would avoid the 
potential for high levels of unprivileged belligerency because 
they would have the lawful ability to directly participate in 
hostilities. There is also a strong argument that certain PMSCs 
would benefit more from the lawful ability to engage in 
hostilities than from the protection of civilian status. This 
assertion is especially true in situations in which the other side 
may lack the incentives or capability to abide by the laws of war 
and respect civilian status. Rather than needing legal (civilian) 
protection before any attack, PMSCs might prefer legal 
(combatant) protection for responding to an attack. A practical 
concern may be that granting PMSCs the legal entitlement to 
shoot would be unwise, especially in light of such incidents as 
the Nisour Square massacre.164 Status as a belligerent, however, 
only grants the combatant the right to lawfully engage in 
hostilities pursuant to international humanitarian law.165 
Consequently, PMSC personnel would be obligated to abide by 
IHL in the same way as other parties to the conflict, which, 
unsurprisingly, would not allow them to lawfully open fire on a 
plaza of civilians. 
Second, Article 4(A)(2) deals with groups, not 
individuals.166 As a result, PMSCs hired to perform contractor 
                                                                                                                                     
162. Similarly, the PMSC “Draft Convention generally envisages that such 
remedies [for violations of IHL and human rights] will be found in the national 
systems of the contracting parties . . . .” White, supra note 77, at 148; see id. at 143 
(explaining that because “effective control and accountability of PMSCs” demands 
“national regulation . . . . The Draft Convention requires state parties to ‘establish a 
comprehensive domestic regime of regulation and oversight over the activities in its 
territory of PMSCs’”). 
163. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 250 (observing that Article 4(A)(2) classifies 
noncomplying parties as civilians, a classification that brings with it the risk of being 
considered illegal combatants under the Conventions). 
164. See Johnston & Broder, supra note 2 (describing how Blackwater security 
personnel shot and killed seventeen Iraqi civilians at Nisour Square). 
165. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law 
of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 999–1000 (2009) (describing “the combatant 
privilege”). 
166. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 583; Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527. 
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combatant activities should be examined at the company level, 
not the individual level.167 This distinction would allow for a 
categorical approach to determining combatant status at the 
moment of employing some PMSCs, rather than requiring a 
difficult post hoc determination of direct participation at the 
individual level in every single case. Accordingly, for PMSCs 
hired to perform contractor combatant activities, there would be 
no need to split such hairs over issues such as whether the 
contractor was on-duty.168 
Third, placing PMSCs under Article 4(A)(2) is consistent 
with the IHL framework. Article 4(A)(2) broadly covers 
“militias,” which does not include government employees.169 It is 
an intuitively logical classification of an organized group hired 
to participate directly in hostilities on the behalf of a party to the 
conflict, when that group does not fit the definition of a 
mercenary. Although one commentator highlights the historical 
purpose of Article 4(A)(2) as being at odds with placing PMSCs 
within it, the same commentator recognizes that “there is no 
obligation to restrict the interpretation of Article 4(A)(2) to its 
historical purpose.”170 Indeed, given the limited number of 
treaties regulating armed conflict, it makes more sense to read 
Article 4(A)(2) functionally, rather than historically, in order to 
regulate a new presence in the theater of armed conflict. 
Finally, such an approach would not eliminate the method 
espoused in the Montreux Document. Many contractors would 
still be considered civilians and would still fall under the direct 
participation determination. This approach seeks instead to 
modify the ICRC’s position by placing a category of PMSCs—
those hired to perform contractor combatant activities—
presumptively onto the combatant side. 
The strongest potential disadvantages to this approach are 
practical. States may be unable or unwilling to regulate PMSCs. 
Private military and security companies also are often politically 
powerful and many operate multinationally, rendering effective 
                                                                                                                                     
167. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (examining the Article 4(A)(2) 
requirements as they would apply to companies). 
168. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
169. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2); Schmitt, supra note 
21, at 527. 
170. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 586. 
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State-level regulation difficult.171 A treaty provision may be 
difficult to draft, adopt, and ratify. Nonetheless, any suggested 
regulation of PMSCs will encounter similar practical difficulties. 
Additionally, this proposal chooses to regulate the existence of 
PMSCs in situations of armed conflict (an approach consistent 
with the Montreux Document, which has garnered significant 
governmental approval),172 rather than to prohibit broadly the 
scope of their participation (the position the Mercenary 
Working Group espouses in the PMSC Draft Convention). It is 
therefore more likely to achieve governmental acceptance and 
recognition, especially by countries in which the PMSC industry 
already is established.173 This proposal aims not to solve all the 
problems resulting from the prevalence of PMSCs in situations 
of armed conflict, but rather to suggest a more nuanced and 
coherent form of regulating them under international 
humanitarian law. 
CONCLUSION 
Private military and security companies strain the 
combatant-civilian dichotomy under international humanitarian 
law. In light of the ambiguity over their status, the general 
consensus is that the great majority of PMSC personnel should 
be presumed civilians. Consequently, they receive protection 
unless and until they “directly participate” in hostilities. Yet 
there are serious deficiencies with this categorization: 
contractors regularly engage in activities that amount to direct 
participation, direct participation provides an ephemeral line in 
a field where clear boundaries are necessary, and direct 
participation by civilian contractors in hostilities constitutes 
unprivileged belligerency. 
                                                                                                                                     
171. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Hurst, Note, “Trade in Force”: The Need for Effective 
Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 447, 450–51 
(2011). 
172. Thirty-eight States currently support the Montreux Document. See 
Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWISS FED. DEP'T FOREIGN AFF., 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last 
updated Dec. 6, 2011). 
173. See White, supra note 77, at 139 (noting that trying to prohibit the 
outsourcing of security services may be futile because “it may be that the horse has 
bolted in some countries, especially . . . the US and the UK, where the PMSC industry is 
well-developed and influential”). 
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Accordingly, a more practical and analytically satisfactory 
approach is to craft a list of “contractor combatant activities” 
that constitute direct participation in hostilities. If contracting 
States hired PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant activities, 
a proposed treaty provision would presume the PMSC personnel 
to be combatants and contracting States would be required to 
ensure that such contractors abided by the requirements of 
Article 4(A)(2). The treaty provision would require compliance 
in international armed conflict and, ideally, in noninternational 
armed conflict as well. This approach provides a workable line 
by which to more cleanly sever PMSC activities along the 
principle of distinction, and to allow for more effective 
regulation of their inevitable presence on and around the 
battlefield. 
 
